Mr. Sickles Goes to Washington
In February 1864, the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War called upon Dan Sickles who was eager to cooperate. During his testimony, the one-legged general presented his biased account of the events of July 2, 1863. .
Established in December 1861, the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War was created to monitor the progress of the Civil War. Over time, its responsibilities expanded to include investigations into corruption and military contracts. From the beginning, the committee took a partisan approach, serving as a platform for generals to defend their actions and shift blame onto others.
In February 1864, the committee, investigating the dismissal of Joe Hooker and the operations of the Army of the Potomac, called upon Dan Sickles, who was eager to cooperate. During his testimony on February 25, the one-legged general presented his biased account of the events that occurred on July 2, 1863. This marked the first time he publicly shared his version of the story.
His unvarnished testimony presented here reflects Sickles' views on Meade's leadership during the battle.
Words: General Dan Sickles testimony, February 25, 1864
From: Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 1865
"Not having received any orders in reference to my position, and observing, from the enemy's movements on our left, what I thought to be conclusive indications of a design on their part to attack there, and that seeming to me to be our most assailable point, I went in person to headquarters and reported the facts and circumstances which led me to believe that an attack would be made there, and asked for orders. I did not receive any orders, and I found that my impression as to the intention of the enemy to attack in that direction was not concurred in at headquarters; and I was satisfied, from information which I received, that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg. I asked General Meade to go over the ground on the left and examine it. He said his engagements did not permit him to do that. I then asked him to send General Warren with me, or by himself; but General Warren's engagements were such as to make it inconvenient for him to go. I then asked him to send General Hunt, his chief-of-artillery, and that was done. General Hunt accompanied me upon a careful reconnoissance of the whole position on the left, in reference to its topography and the best line for us to occupy, and also with reference to the movements of the enemy. I pointed out to General Hunt the line that on a subsequent part of the day, when the battle opened, I actually occupied; that is, a line from Round Top on the left, perpendicular to the Emmettsburg road, but somewhat en echelon, with the line of battle established on Cemetery ridge. I asked for General Hunt's sanction, in the name of General Meade, for the occupation of that line. He declined to give it, although he said it met with the approval of his own judgment; but he said that I would undoubtedly receive such orders as soon as he reported to General Meade. Before making my dispositions on that line, I waited for some time for orders, but received none. The enemy's demonstrations became more and more decided.I had strengthened and supported my outposts in order to give me timely notice of the attack, which I knew was very imminent. Buford's cavalry, which had been on the left, had been withdrawn. I remonstrated against that, and expressed the hope that the cavalry, or some portion of it, at all events, might be allowed to remain there. I was informed that it was not the intention to remove the whole of the cavalry, and that a portion of it would be returned. It did not return, however.
The Leister house, shown here in a modern image, served as General Meade’s headquarters at Gettysburg. (photograph by Jeffrey Biggs)
My outposts became engaged, and were being driven back from their supports. I determined to wait no longer the absence of orders, and proceeded to make my dispositions on the advanced line, as it is called. I took up that position, which is described in the report of General Halleck as a line from half to three-quarters of a mile in advance, as he says, and which, in his report, he very pointedly disapproves of, and which he further says I took up through a misinterpretation of orders. It was not through any misinterpretation of orders. It was either a good line or a bad one, and, whichever it was, I took it on my own responsibility, except so far as I have already stated, that it was approved of in general terms by General Hunt, of General Meade's staff, who accompanied me in the examination of it. I took up that line because it enabled me to hold commanding ground, which, if the enemy had been allowed to take — as they would have taken it if I had not occupied it in force — would have rendered our position on the left untenable; and, in my judgment, would have turned the fortunes of the day hopelessly against us. I think that any general who would look at the topography of the country there would naturally come to the same conclusion.While I was making my dispositions on this line I received a communication from headquarters to attend a consultation of corps commanders. I sent word verbally by the officer who brought me the communication, begging, if possible, to be excused, stating that the enemy were in great force in my front, and intimating that I would very soon be engaged, and that I was making my dispositions to meet tlie attack. I hastened forward the movements of my troops as rapidly as possible, and had got my batteries in position, when I received another and peremptory order to report at once in person at headquarters, to meet the corps commanders. I turned over the command temporarily to General Birney in my absence, feeling assured that before I could return the engagement would open. I hastened to headquarters with all speed, but before I got there, the sound of the cannon announced that the battle had opened. However, I was quite near headquarters at the time and pushed on, but found that the consultation had been broken up by the opening of the battle. General Meade met me just outside of his headquarters and excused me from dismounting, he remarked that he observed, from the sound of the cannon, that my troops were engaged with the enemy. He said that I should return at once, and that he would follow me very soon. “General Meade met me just outside of his headquarters and excused me from dismounting, he remarked that he observed, from the sound of the cannon, that my troops were engaged with the enemy.”
On my way I found that the enemy were moving up to the attack in great force, in two lines of battle, supported by three columns. Fortunately, my left had succeeded in getting into position on Round Top and along the commanding ridge to which I have referred; and those positions were firmly held by the 3rd Corps. General Meade soon afterwards arrived on the field and made a rapid examination of the dispositions which I had made, and of the situation. He remarked to me that my line was too extended, and expressed his doubts as to my being able to hold so extended a line, in which I coincided in the main — that is to say, I replied that I could not, with one corps, hold so extended a line against the rebel army; but that, if supported, the line could be held; and, in my judgment, it was a strong line, and the best one. I stated, however, that if he disapproved of it; it was not yet too late to take any position he might indicate. He said "No;" that it would be better to hold that line, and he would send up the 5th Corps to support me. I expressed my belief in my ability to hold that line until supports could arrive. He said he would send up the 5th Corps on my left, and that on my right I could look to General Hancock for support of my right flank. I added that I should want considerable artillery; that the enemy were developing a strong force of artillery. He authorized me to send to General Hunt, who commanded the reserve of the artillery, for as much artillery as I wanted. I then assured him of my entire confidence in my ability to hold the position; which I did. The 5th Corps came up, somewhat tardily, to be sure. It was three-quarters of an hour, or an hour I suppose, before it got into position. My request to General Hancock for supports was promptly met; and I feel myself under obligations principally to General Hancock and the troops of his command for the effective support which enabled me, in connexion with my own corps and the artillery which I received from the reserve, to hold the position during that very desperate encounter of Thursday, where the principal operations of Thursday occurred. The position was held, and the attacks of the enemy, which were made in great force and with great obstinacy and determination, were successfully repulsed, with terrific loss to them and a very heavy loss on our side, until I was wounded and carried from the field. The command of the 3d Corps then devolved on Major General Birney, and, of course, I only know about the subsequent operations from the perusal of his report..."
General Meade appeared before the committee on March 5. His testimony was less accusatory than Sickles', attributing Sickles' battlefield performance to poor judgment rather than incompetence. To the right are some quotes from Meade’s testimony on Sickles.
“I had sent instructions in the morning to General Sickles, commanding the 3d corps, directing him to form his corps in line of battle on the left of the 2d corps, commanded by General Hancock, and I had indicated to him in general terms, that his right was to rest upon General Hancock’s left; and his left was to extend to the Round Top mountain, plainly visible, if it was practicable to occupy it. During the morning I sent a staff officer to inquire of General Sickles whether he was in position. The reply was returned to me that General Sickles said there was no position there...”
He (Sickles) then said to me that there was in the neighborhood of where his corps was some very good ground for artillery, and that he should like to have some staff officer of mine go out there and see as to the posting of artillery. He also asked me whether he was not authorized to post his corps in such manner as, in his judgment, he should deem the most suitable I answered General Sickles, “Certainly, within the limits of the general instructions I have given to you ; any ground within those limits you choose to occupy I leave to you,” And I directed Brigadier General Hunt, my chief of artillery, to accompany General Sickles and examine and inspect such positions as General Sickles thought good for artillery, and to give General Sickles the benefit of his judgment...””