“The Whole Confederate Army Was Assembled”
Any study of the Sickles-Meade saga must begin with the account of Brigadier General Henry Jackson Hunt, who served as Chief of Artillery in the Army of the Potomac. Hunt was uniquely positioned and unbiased to describe the events that would remain contested for the next couple of decades.
A view of the Gettysburg battlefield from Little Round Top, which was desperately fought over on the afternoon of July 2, 1863. (Library of Congress)
On the afternoon of July 2, Hunt was sent by Major General George G. Meade to assist Major General Daniel E. Sickles in positioning artillery on favorable ground in front of him, which Sickles wanted to cover. However, upon discovering that the ground General Sickles wished to occupy was well in advance of the Federal line, General Hunt, unaware of Meade's battle plans, deferred any decision until he could confer with headquarters.
Years later, Hunt wrote about this incident, and his account is crucial in establishing the foundation for the later controversy. Here we include an abridged version of an article Hunt wrote for Century Magazine detailing his recollections of the afternoon of July 2, 1863, at Gettysburg.
Words: Henry Jackson Hunt
From: “The Second Day at Gettysburg,” Battles and Leaders, V. 3. (1887)
The morning was busy and in some respects an anxious one, it was believed that the whole Confederate army was assembled, that it was equal if not superior to our own in numbers, and that the battle would commence before our troops were up. There was a gap in Slocum's line awaiting a division of infantry, and as some demonstrations of Ewell about daylight indicated an immediate attack at that point, I had to draw batteries from other parts of the line — for the Artillery Reserve was just then starting from Taneytown — to cover it until it could be properly filled. Still there was no hostile movement of the enemy, and General Meade directed Slocum to hold himself in readiness to attack Ewell with the Fifth and Twelfth, so soon as the Sixth Corps should arrive. After an examination Slocum reported the ground as unfavorable, in which Warren concurred and advised against an attack there. The project was then abandoned, and Meade postponed all offensive operations until the enemy's intentions should be more clearly developed. In the meantime he took precautionary measures. It was clearly now to his advantage to fight the battle where he was, and he had some apprehension that Lee would attempt to turn his flank and threaten his communications, — just what Longstreet had been advising. In this case it might be necessary to fall back to the Pipe Creek line, if possible, or else to follow Lee's movement into the open country. In either case, or in that of a forced withdrawal, prudence dictated that arrangements should be made in advance, and General Meade gave instructions for examining the roads and communications, and to draw up an order of movement, which General Butterfield, the chief-of-staff, seems to have considered an order absolute for the withdrawal of the army without a battle.
A modern view of the Trostle Farm House. The farm served as General Sickles’ headquarters command. (photograph by Jeffrey Biggs)
These instructions must have been given early in the morning, for General Butterfield states that it was on his arrival from Taneytown, which place he left at daylight. An order was drawn up accordingly, given to the adjutant general, and perhaps prepared for issue in case of necessity to corps commanders; but it was not recorded nor issued, nor even a copy of it preserved. General Meade declared that he never contemplated the issue of such an order unless contingencies made it necessary; and his acts and dispatches during the day were in accordance with his statement. There is one circumstance pertaining to my own duties which to my mind is conclusive, and I relate it because it may have contributed to the idea that General Meade intended to withdraw from Gettysburg. He came to me that morning before the Artillery Reserve had arrived, and, therefore, about the time that the order was in course of preparation, and informed me that one of the army corps had left its whole artillery ammunition train behind it, and that others were also deficient, notwithstanding his orders on that subject. He was very much disturbed, and feared that, taking into account the large expenditure of the preceding day by the First and Eleventh corps, there would not be sufficient to carry us through the battle. This was not the first nor the last time that I was called upon to meet deficiencies under such circumstances, and I was, therefore, prepared for this, having directed General Tyler, commanding the Artillery Reserve, whatever else he might leave behind, to bring up every round of ammunition in his trains, and I knew he would not fail me. Moreover, I had previously, on my own responsibility, and unknown to General Hooker, formed a special ammunition column attached to the Artillery Reserve, carrying twenty rounds per gun, over and above the authorized amount, for every gun in the army, in order to meet such emergencies. I was, therefore, able to assure General Meade that there would be enough ammunition for the battle, but none for idle cannonades, the besetting sin of some of our commanders. He was much relieved, and expressed his satisfaction. Now, had he had at this time any intention of withdrawing the army, the first thing to get rid of would have been this Artillery Reserve and its large trains, which were then blocking the roads in our rear; and he would surely have told me of it...“General Sickles asked me if he should move forward his corps. I answered, “not ony my authority; I will report to General Meade for his instructions.””
General Henry Jackson Hunt in the uniform of a Major General. (Library of Congress)
On my return to headquarters from [the course of my inspection of the lines] General Meade told me that General Sickles, then with him, wished me to examine a new line, as he thought that assigned to him was not a good one, especially that he could not use his artillery there. I had been as far as Round Top that morning, and had noticed the unfavorable character of the ground, and, therefore, I accompanied Sickles direct to the Peach Orchard, where he pointed out the ridges, already described, as his proposed line. They commanded all the ground behind, as well as in front of them, and together constituted a favorable position for the enemy to hold. This was one good reason for our taking possession of it. It would, it is true, in our hands present a salient angle, which generally exposes both its sides to enfilade fires; but here the ridges were so high that each would serve as a "traverse" for the other, and reduce that evil to a minimum. On the other hand it would so greatly lengthen our line — which in any case must rest on Round Top, and connect with the left of the Second Corps — as to require a larger force than the Third Corps alone to hold it, and it would be difficult to occupy and strengthen the angle if the enemy already held the wood in its front. At my instance General Sickles ordered a reconnoissance to ascertain if the wood was occupied.
A wartime photograph by Alexander Gardner of the headquarters of General George G. Meade on Cemetery Ridge. " (Library of Congress)
About this time a cannonade was opened on Cemetery Hill, which indicated an attack there, and as I had examined the Emmitsburg Ridge, I said I would not await the result of the reconnaissance but return to headquarters by way of Round Top, and examine that part of the proposed line. As I was leaving. General Sickles asked me if he should move forward his corps. I answered, "Not on my authority; I will report to General Meade for his instructions." I had not reached the wheat-field when a sharp rattle of musketry showed that the enemy held the wood in front of the Peach Orchard angle...After finishing my examination I returned to headquarters and briefly reported to Greneral Meade that the proposed line was a good one in itself, that it offered favorable positions for artillery, but that its relations to other lines were such that I could not advise it, and suggested that he examine it himself before ordering its occupation. He nodded assent, and I proceeded to Cemetery Hill.
The origin of the controversy: The Trostle farm is the starting point of the longstanding dispute between General Sickles and Meade. (photograph by Jeffrey Biggs)
Recommended reading: Gettysburg: The Second Day by Harry W. Pfanz (The University of North Carolina Press, 1987)
The cannonade there still continued; it had been commenced by the enemy, and was accompanied by some movements of troops toward our right. As soon as I saw that it would lead to nothing serious, I returned direct to the Peach Orchard, knowing that its occupation would require large reinforcements of artillery. I was here met by Captain Randolph, the corps chief of artillery, who informed me that he had been ordered to place his batteries on the new line. Seeing Generals Meade and Sickles, not far off, in conversation, and supposing that General Meade had consented to the occupation, I sent at once to the reserve for more artillery, and authorized other general officers to draw on the same source.